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I. Introduction
It is a Wednesday afternoon in rural Virginia and a police
officer pulls over a black sedan for speeding on the highway.
Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer makes the standard
request for license and registration and, while the driver is
retrieving those documents, the officer notices a black duffel bag
in the front seat. The officer asks the driver what is in the bag
and the driver opens it and displays $11,000 in cash, explaining
that he owns a car dealership and is driving to the bank to
deposit the proceeds from a recent sale. He explains that the
dealership is located in a rough area of town, that he always feels
uncomfortable holding large amounts of cash there, and that he
has made a practice of immediately depositing money from cash
sales. The officer returns to his patrol vehicle and conducts a
background check, discovering that the driver has two previous
criminal convictions for possession of marijuana, both dating
back roughly ten years. He goes back to the sedan, requests the
duffel bag from the driver, and informs him that there is probable
cause to suspect that he intended to use the money for a drug
transaction and that the officer is seizing it pursuant to the laws
of Virginia. The surprised driver asks if this means he is under
arrest. The police officer calmly informs him that, no, he is free to
go, but the $11,000 is now the property of the state of Virginia.
Indignant, the driver protests the seizure and tells the officer
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that he cannot take his money without even charging him with a
crime. The officer smiles and tells the driver that yes, under the
laws of Virginia he certainly can, and that if the driver wants the
money back he can contest the seizure in court.
Consider another hypothetical. John Smith lives in
Lynchburg, Virginia, but inherited his childhood home in
Lexington, Virginia, from his parents in 2013 when they both
unfortunately died in a car crash. Rather than selling the house,
John started renting it out to college students. The house is on a
small plot of land that includes a small wooded area in the back.
John works in Lynchburg but occasionally visits the house to
conduct repairs, such as fixing the gutters on the roof or
power-washing the sidewalk out front. One day, he receives a
phone call from the Lexington police department, informing him
that the tenants of the house have been arrested for growing
marijuana in the wooded lot and selling cocaine inside the house
to other college students. Naturally, John expresses dismay that
such nefarious activities have been taking place on his land and
assures the officer that he never participated in any of the
drug-related activities. The officer allays his fears and assures
him that he is not under investigation for any connection to the
crime. “However,” the officer tells him, “the Lexington police
department is initiating seizure proceedings against the house
and land because it was being used to facilitate the manufacture
and sale of controlled substances.” Shocked, John asks the officer
what that means. The officer tells him that he will be receiving a
notice in the mail shortly advising him of his rights. Two weeks
later, John receives a letter from the clerk of court, officially
informing him of the seizure of his land and advising him of his
rights to contest the forfeiture and appear in court.
Both the car dealership owner and John Smith have fallen
victim to one of the most common law enforcement techniques for
generating revenue.1 Neither was charged with a crime, neither
1. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, AUDIT
REPORT 15-08, AUDIT OF THE ASSETS FORFEITURE FUND AND SEIZED ASSET DEPOSIT
FUND ANNUAL FINANCIAL STATEMENTS: FISCAL YEAR 2014 (2015) (stating that, for
the past nine years, United States law enforcement agencies have seized over $1
billion worth of assets); see also MATTHEW J. HICKMAN & BRIAN A. REAVES,
BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, SHERIFFS’ OFFICES 2003, at 16 (2006) (explaining
that, as early as 2002, over half of all sheriffs’ offices in the United States
benefited financially from civil asset forfeiture).
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was investigated by the police department for possible criminal
activity, but both suddenly lost significant assets during what
was otherwise a perfectly normal day. Fortunately for them,
there are procedures in place by which they can fight against
the seizure and possibly get their property back. 2 Unfortunately
for them, once that state claims probable cause to forfeit their
property, the owners have the burden to prove that an
exemption applies that would save their property from asset
forfeiture or else lose their property permanently to the state
government.3 They would also be surprised to find out that, in
both cases, the seizure was effectively a financial windfall for
the local police departments.4 Under Virginia law, the police
departments will be able to keep up to 90% of the cash or the
proceeds from the sale of the house, with the other 10% going to
the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS). 5
If these property owners have the financial wherewithal to
pursue the case in court (many do not), 6 they may have to
litigate against the state for several years 7 to affirmatively
2. See DEP’T OF CRIM. JUST. SERV. OF VA., FORFEITED ASSET SHARING
MANUAL (2015) (explaining that, after the Commonwealth’s Attorney initiates
forfeiture by filing an Information with the Circuit Court, the owner of the
property has thirty days to file an answer laying claim to the property and
stating why forfeiture should not occur).
3. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2‐386.8 (2015) (listing exemptions that the
claimant must prove apply, such as a landlord not knowing or having reason to
know of illegal activity).
4. See VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, ASSET FORFEITURE 75 (2015) (recording
that in 2014, Virginia law enforcement agencies received a total of over
$4,000,000 in proceeds from seized assets at the state level, with approximately
$6,000,000 more coming from federal programs).
5. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2‐386.14 (2012) (stating that the DCJS
automatically keeps 10% of the proceeds for an administrative fund and then
distributes the remaining 90% among the departments that participated in the
seizure).
6. See Sarah Stillman, Taken, NEW YORKER (Aug. 12, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/08/12/taken (last visited May 1,
2017) (detailing how law enforcement officers target minorities in part because
they are unlikely to have to resources to litigate the cases in court) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
7. See Jacob Sullum, How Cops Got a License to Steal Your Money, FORBES
(Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobsullum/2014/09/11/how-copsgot-a-license-to-steal-your-money/ (last visited May 1, 2017) (discussing the case
of Mandrel Stuart, in which it took so long to get his seized money back that he
lost his restaurant) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also
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prove their innocence.8 If they cannot do this, the police
department will be able to keep the property without having
obtained a single criminal conviction.9 This is civil asset
forfeiture.
Civil asset forfeiture, firmly established in the 1990s, has
become increasingly criticized, particularly on the state level.10 It
has had some beneficial effects such as enabling law enforcement
to seize the assets of known drug dealers when criminal
convictions are not forthcoming.11 But there are also genuine
concerns due to less stringent standards of proof.12 For instance,
in criminal cases, guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.13 The majority of civil asset forfeiture cases, however,
require only preponderance of the evidence.14 In addition,
Commonwealth v. Brunson, 448 S.E.2d 393, 394 (Va. 1994) (noting that in two
cases, Brunson and Commonwealth v. $1950 U.S. Currency and One Hi-Tech
Pager, Record No. 931658, faulty seizures had occurred three years before and
yet the owners had still not won their property back in court).
8. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2‐386.8 (1989) (stating that the claimant must
affirmatively prove innocence through a listed exception, and providing a
non-exhaustive list of exemptions that can be argued).
9. See id. (describing how the property is forfeited if the claimant cannot
prove an exemption).
10. See Michael Sallah, Robert O’Harrow Jr., Steven Rich & Gabe
Silverman,
Stop
and
Seize,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
6,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/09/06/stop-and-seize/ (last
visited May 1, 2017) (detailing criticisms against applications of civil asset
forfeiture, particularly on the state level) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
11. See VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, supra note 4, at 32 (relating the case of a
woman who kept buying cars for her drug dealer connections with no logical
explanation).
12. See Sallah et al., supra note 10 (reporting on the different burdens of
proof required under state civil forfeiture laws, almost all of which are less than
beyond a reasonable doubt).
13. See James Q. Whitman, The Origins of “Reasonable Doubt,” YALE
FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP SERIES (2005), http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/
fss_papers/1 (last visited May 1, 2017) (explaining that, while the phrase
“reasonable doubt” is not located anywhere in the Constitution, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly read it into case law since the 1970s (citing In re Winship,
357 U.S. 358 (1970))) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
14. See DICK M. CARPENTER II, LISA KNEPPER, ANGELA C. ERICKSON &
JENNIFER MCDONALD, POLICING FOR PROFIT 16 (2d ed. 2016) (recording that most
states use the preponderance of the evidence standard, while others use higher
standards such as clear and convincing or lower standards such as probable
cause).
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evidence suggests a type of “perverse incentive” for many police
officers to seize property they would not have ordinarily taken.15
This result occurs because many states, including Virginia, allow
local law enforcement agencies to keep some or all of the property
that they confiscate.16 Furthermore, a large number of property
owners do not have the time, resources, or knowledge to contest
the forfeitures of their property.17 Thus, the law essentially
creates a numbers game in which officers can play the odds by
seizing as much property as possible, even when they know they
would likely lose the cases in court.18 In doing so, they are relying
on the likelihood that affected property owners will not contest
the seizure of their property.19 These are the types of concerns
that are often present in personal property cases as in the first
hypothetical.
Real property cases—like the second hypothetical—pose two
additional concerns: innocent co-owners and the irreplaceability
of property. Problems with innocent co-owners arose early in the
civil asset forfeiture era, and the Supreme Court initially ruled in
Bennis v. Michigan20 that no protections extended to these
individuals.21 In response to the public outcry following this
15. See Sallah et al., supra note 10 (providing data that law enforcement
agencies drastically increased their number of seizure cases once asset forfeiture
started aiding their budgets).
16. See VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, supra note 4, at 74 (explaining how local
law enforcement agencies in Virginia are permitted to keep up to 90% of the
drug-related assets they seize).
17. See Stillman, supra note 6 (pointing out that many property owners
and particularly minorities lack the funds to litigate for the return of their
property).
18. See VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, supra note 4, at 81 (reporting that less
than one percent of civil forfeiture cases actually went to trial, with most owners
choosing not even to try to get their property back).
19. See id. (referencing a study which showed that most persons who fell
victim to asset forfeiture were minorities, immigrants, or poor individuals).
20. 516 U.S. 442 (1996).
21. See id. at 446 (holding that due process was not violated when the
innocent petitioner was deprived of her property interest in the forfeited asset).
In Bennis, the Court addressed whether the innocent co-owner of a vehicle was
deprived of due process when the state seized the vehicle due to her husband’s
illegal activity. Id. at 443. John and Tina Bennis jointly owned an automobile;
John was arrested for sexual conduct with a prostitute inside this vehicle on a
public street. Id. Following John’s arrest, the state sued to seize the vehicle as a
public nuisance. Id. at 443–44. Tina Bennis argued before the court that,
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decision, Congress passed legislation allowing a defense for
innocent co-owners, and most states followed suit.22 The burden,
however, is still on the innocent co-owner (or landlord-owner) to
actively prove that he did not know and had no reason to know
about the criminal activity.23 While this may seem reasonable on
the surface, complications often arise in cases like the John
Smith rental property hypothetical. For example, a court might
ask whether an absentee landlord should have been able to
discover cocaine in the house or marijuana growing in a back
lot.24 Combine this with the lower standard of proof requirement,
and one can see how it would be all too easy for an innocent
landowner to lose his property.25
The uniqueness of real property adds a further wrinkle to
these concerns. Property law establishes the principle that no two
pieces of real property are exactly the same—people develop
because she had no knowledge that her husband was using the car for illegal
activities, the state would be violating her due process interests if the court
eliminated her property rights because of her husband’s actions. Id. at 444. In
considering the case, the Supreme Court looked to a long line of historical asset
forfeiture cases and reached the conclusion that a property interest can be
eliminated if the property is used for illegal ends, even if the owner had no
knowledge of it. Id. Analogizing the forfeiture laws to dangerous driving laws, in
which an owner may be held responsible for the actions of a driver to which he
lent a vehicle, the Court concluded that because the petitioner would have been
liable for her husband’s dangerous driving actions, there was no precedent
showing that she should escape liability for his public indecency actions. Id. at
452. The vehicle both “facilitated and was used for criminal activity,” and the
Court decided that, given the weight of historical precedent to the contrary, the
Constitution did not provide an innocent owner defense. Id. at 453.
22. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(d) (2009) (establishing the innocent owner defense
for federal asset forfeiture cases); see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2‐386.8 (2015)
(stating that the criteria for an innocent owner defense under Virginia law is
usually no knowledge or reason to know of the criminal activity).
23. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2‐386.8 (2015) (“No owner’s interest may be
forfeited under this chapter if the court finds that: [h]e did not know and had no
reason to know of the conduct giving rise to forfeiture.”).
24. See id. (stating that a landlord may be held liable for a tenant’s
criminal conduct if the landlord had reason to know of the conduct).
25. For a disturbing example of how easily this can happen, see Pamela
Brown, Parents’ House Seized After Son’s Drug Bust, CNN (Sept. 8, 2014),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/03/us/philadelphia-drug-bust-house-seizure/
(last
visited May 1, 2017) (reporting how a family was literally forced onto the streets
after their son was arrested for selling forty dollars’ worth of heroin out of the
home without his parents’ knowledge) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
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personal connections to land and houses, and these connections
cannot simply be replaced.26 If the state seizes a large amount of
cash from an individual, the money can easily be replaced with
similar bills and coins. If law enforcement seizes a house,
however, the individual must temporarily create a home
elsewhere during the proceedings, perhaps even permanently.27
Because of these problems with civil asset forfeiture in the
context of real property, several states have added special
protections.28 While these protections do help, many states,
including Virginia, either do not have any protections or very
limited protections.29
This Note evaluates the current state of American civil asset
forfeiture laws on both the federal and state level. It focuses on
modern problems with the system and corrective approaches that
have been taken across the fifty states.30 Part II provides the
background for civil asset forfeiture in the United States, starting
from its conception in the mid-1980s.31 Part III examines the
26. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV.
957, 958 (1982) (explaining how a person’s identity can get bound up in
property—particularly land, requiring stronger property protections). Personal
property like engagement rings can also affect a person’s identity in the same
way; however, due to the inherent difficulty of addressing such exceptions, this
Note proceeds on the premise that real property possesses the main personhood
elements. See id. (listing wedding rings among items that can affect an
individual’s identity).
27. See Isaiah Thompson, How the DA’s Forfeiture Program Made a Family
Homeless, PHIL. CITY PAPER (Aug. 15, 2013), https://mycitypaper.com/News/Howthe-DAs-forfeiture-program-made-a-family-homelessltbr/gtltbr/gt (last visited
May 1, 2017) (relaying the story of a family who was forced to leave their home
for a motel, then the backwoods, and then finally a relative’s house, all because
their house was seized during a flawed asset forfeiture case) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
28. Maine is one of the states providing special protections for civil asset
forfeiture of real property. See 15 M.R.S.A. § 5821 (1987) (placing the burden of
proof on the state to prove knowledge or complicity with criminal actions when
it comes to the forfeiture of real property).
29. Virginia provides some limited protections. See VA CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-386.22 (2014) (stating that real property cannot be seized unless the
alleged crime carries a minimum of five years imprisonment).
30. See infra Part III (explaining the various modern approaches that
different states have taken to regulate civil asset forfeiture).
31. See infra Part II (giving a history of the development of civil asset
forfeiture in America, particularly in regards to the modern connection between
forfeited assets and local law enforcement funding).

CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE IN VIRGINIA

1303

various state forfeiture laws across the United States, including
the different ways in which states handle burdens of evidence,
equitable sharing, and task force combinations with federal
agents.32 Part IV focuses on Virginia’s civil asset forfeiture
statutes, particularly in regard to the various protections (or lack
thereof) provided to owners of personal and real property.33 Part
IV.A addresses the existing concerns with Virginia’s current laws
on civil forfeiture and personal property.34 It also discusses the
need for better oversight in regards to how law enforcement
spends the funds from asset forfeiture.35 Part IV.B examines
Virginia statutes regarding the forfeiture of real property.36 In
doing so, it looks at the limited protections that Virginia laws do
offer and whether or not more protections would be workable
given the current system.37 Finally, Part V explains legislative
proposals to fix the Virginia system and solutions suggested by
the Virginia State Crime Commission and advocates for further
reforms.38
II. History of Civil Asset Forfeiture
A. Development
While civil asset forfeiture can trace its origins back to
English common law, the United States did not begin to seriously
32. See infra Part III (describing the different state approaches to civil
asset forfeiture and the variations on procedural matters such as burdens of
proof).
33. See infra Part IV (explaining Virginia’s procedures and the few
protections offered to personal property owners, and limited protections
provided to real property owners).
34. See infra Part IV.A (noting the potential for abuse, particularly with
the waiver system).
35. See infra Part IV.A (discussing how the current system fails to provide
oversight when it comes to agency expenditure of asset forfeiture funds).
36. See infra Part IV.B (explaining current limitations on law
enforcement’s seizure of real property).
37. See infra Part IV.B (pointing out the statutory protection regarding real
property seized in relation to drugs and the limited role that real property plays
in Virginia forfeiture today).
38. See infra Part V (examining HB 1287, the 2015 VSCC report, and the
2016 reforms enacted in Virginia).

1304

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1295 (2017)

use it until the war on drugs reached the forefront of the political
theater.39 Congress began the widespread use of asset forfeiture
with the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,40 which
established the Assets Forfeiture Fund as a “repository of the
proceeds of forfeitures.”41 This fund opened up channels for law
enforcement agencies to not only seize personal and real property
connected to crimes, but also to keep some or all of the seized
assets.42 Civil asset forfeiture started out as a federal program
and quickly spread to the state level, with almost every state
today having individualized forfeiture laws.43 States picked up on
civil asset forfeiture so quickly due to the establishment of
equitable sharing programs with the federal government.44 These
sharing programs allowed state law enforcement to keep property
seized under both state laws and federal statutes, such as drug
laws.45

39. See John Malcolm, Civil Asset Forfeiture: When Good Intentions Go
Awry,
HERITAGE
FOUNDATION
(Oct.
26,
2015),
http://cf.heritage.org/research/testimony/civil-asset-forfeiture-when-goodintentions-go-awry (last visited May 1, 2017) (stating that civil asset forfeiture
was established to combat the cash flows and business enterprises of drug
kingpins) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
40. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984) (stating that all seized
assets or the proceeds thereof should be transferred into the Assets Forfeiture
Fund for later distribution).
41. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. ASSETS FORFEITURE FUND, FY 2013 PERFORMANCE
BUDGET (2013).
42. See What Civil Asset Forfeiture Means, ECONOMIST (Apr. 14, 2014, 11:50
PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/04/economistexplains-7 (last visited May 1, 2017) (discussing how quickly states
implemented asset forfeiture laws after Congress expanded civil asset forfeiture
during the war on drugs) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
43. See CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 14, at 112 (recording that North
Carolina is the only state that generally does not permit civil forfeiture, with the
exception of racketeering cases).
44. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(3) (2012) (allowing state and local law
enforcement agencies to retain property seized under federal laws, splitting the
proceeds with participating federal agencies).
45. See CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 14, at 71 (detailing how state
agencies can keep up to 80% of proceeds seized under federal law through
equitable asset sharing).
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B. Different Types of Forfeiture
Law enforcement can seize property in the United States
through three different processes: administrative, criminal, and
civil forfeiture.46 Administrative forfeiture proceedings often
precede criminal or civil forfeiture and can morph into one of the
other two during the judicial process.47
1. Administrative Forfeiture
Administrative forfeiture begins when law enforcement
investigates potential criminal activity, discovers property linked
to that activity, and seizes it during the course of the
investigation.48 Statutorily, federal agencies must base such
seizures on probable cause;49 state requirements vary from “slight
evidence of traceability”50 to clear and convincing evidence.51 The
seizing agency must then notify any potential owners of the
property of its intent to forfeit the property and publish a public
notice.52 When the owner receives notice, he can contest the
seizure by filing a claim to the property within a certain period of

46. See Stefan D. Cassella, Overview of Asset Forfeiture Law in the United
States, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULLETIN 12 (2007) [hereinafter Cassella, Overview of
Asset Forfeiture Law], http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2007/
12/21/usab5506.pdf (listing the different types of forfeiture laws and explaining
their varied uses by United States law enforcement agencies).
47. See id. at 12–13 (explaining how administrative forfeiture can become
either criminal or civil forfeiture if the property’s owner contests the seizure).
48. See id. (noting that administrative forfeitures are often uncontested
and are considered “nonjudicial” proceedings).
49. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(2)(B) (2012) (stating that federal agencies must
possess probable cause to seize the property during lawful arrest or search
proceedings).
50. See infra note 211 and accompanying text (noting Kentucky’s dual
evidentiary standard system, in which real property has a clear and convincing
evidence standard but non-real property only has a “slight evidence of
traceability” standard).
51. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 54-36h(b), 54-36p(b) (2016) (“[T]he state
shall have the burden of proving all material facts by clear and convincing
evidence.”).
52. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(2)(B)(e) (2012) (detailing the notification
proceedings that the seizing agencies must follow).
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time.53 If the owner does not contest the seizure, the agency can
terminate his ownership interest without any judicial
involvement.54 If the owner files a claim to the property, however,
and the agency desires to pursue the forfeiture further, the
administrative forfeiture proceeding transitions to either criminal
or civil forfeiture proceedings.55
2. Criminal Forfeiture
During criminal forfeiture proceedings, the government
confiscates property as part of a criminal sentence.56 The agency
may commence criminal forfeiture instead of administrative
forfeiture when property is directly linked to a crime, such as
when law enforcement arrests bank robbers and simultaneously
seizes their getaway vehicle.57 In those instances, the officers
directly link the vehicle to the criminal proceedings and the
seizure can bypass administrative forfeiture.58 The agency also
has the option of beginning with administrative forfeiture and
then transitioning into criminal forfeiture59—for example, if the
officers find the bank robbers’ vehicle first, then arrest the
robbers two weeks later. In that case, the agency would seize the
vehicle, commence administrative forfeiture, and transition to
53. See 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2016) (explaining the various sixty- and ninety-day
time periods for contesting seizures).
54. See Cassella, Overview of Asset Forfeiture Law, supra note 46, at 13
(likening administrative forfeiture to an abandonment, as opposed to an actual
judicial proceeding); see also § 983(a)(1) (noting that the owner must file a claim
within the deadline specified in the notice letter, or else administrative
forfeiture proceedings will continue).
55. See § 983(a)(1) (stating that the government has ninety days after an
owner files a claim to either return the property or commence civil or criminal
forfeiture proceedings).
56. See Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 39–41 (1995) (ruling that
criminal forfeiture is an “element” of a criminal conviction and composes part of
the punishment).
57. See § 982(a)(1) (detailing how the Government can criminally forfeit the
property of a person convicted of certain offenses).
58. See id. (providing that property can be criminally forfeited if it is
directly traceable to the offense).
59. See § 983(a)(1) (noting that the Government can terminate
administrative forfeiture proceedings and institute criminal forfeiture
proceedings).
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criminal forfeiture upon arresting the felonious owners.60 After
this transition, the court handles all forfeiture proceedings
judicially, terminating the robbers’ ownership interest in the
vehicle upon criminal conviction.61
Courts consider criminal forfeiture of property to be part of
the in personam criminal action against the defendant.62 This
enables law enforcement to use criminal forfeiture rather
painlessly, because it becomes part of the standard judicial
proceedings.63 Difficulties arise, however, when a third party
retains an ownership interest in this property64—for instance, if
the bank robbers’ vehicle belonged to one of their wives. In that
case, the property cannot be criminally forfeited without violating
the due process rights of the non-convicted person.65 At this point,
if the agency wants the property, it must now pursue a different
avenue of seizure: civil forfeiture.66
3. Civil Forfeiture
Civil forfeiture permits the confiscation of property based
solely upon the property’s connection to criminal activity.67
Naturally, this makes civil forfeiture quite useful in situations
60. See id. (explaining that the agency has sixty days to provide notice of
the seizure but can transition to criminal forfeiture within that time period).
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 982 (2012) (stating that the court can forfeit the
property as part of the criminal sentence).
62. See United States v. Nava, 404 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2005)
(observing that criminal forfeiture is an in personam action that ties the
property directly to the defendant).
63. See § 982 (describing the different ways that criminal forfeiture is
incorporated into trials for various offenses).
64. See Cassella, Overview of Civil Asset Forfeiture Law, supra note 46, at
14 (explaining the difficulties that arise when innocent owners or co-owners are
involved).
65. See United States v. Totaro, 345 F.3d 989, 993 (8th Cir. 2003) (stating
that, due to the in personam nature of criminal forfeiture, due process dictates
that the government cannot forfeit third-party property).
66. See Cassella, Overview of Civil Asset Forfeiture Law, supra note 46, at
14 (relaying the usefulness of civil asset forfeiture when property interests of
non-convicted individuals are involved); see generally 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2016)
(outlining the contours of civil forfeiture).
67. See id. (“[T]he in rem nature of the [civil forfeiture] proceeding allows
the court to order the forfeiture of any property involved in the offense.”).
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like the bank robber hypothetical, where law enforcement cannot
criminally reach the wife of the defendant.68 Civil forfeiture
therefore occupies a unique position of straddling both criminal
and civil law: while civil forfeiture necessarily relates back to
criminal action, the government must file a separate civil action
against the property, wholly unrelated to any criminal
conviction.69
Federal civil forfeiture follows the procedure of most civil
cases.70 The Government files a complaint against the property
and provides notice to the owners.71 The owners file claims to the
property and an answer to the complaint.72 After this, the normal
procedures of discovery and pretrial motions take place, followed
by the eventual trial.73 State forfeiture actions vary, but they
generally follow these procedures; this Note examines the
procedural laws of Virginia in Part IV.74
While law enforcement often uses civil forfeiture in
conjunction with criminal cases, criminal charges are not
required.75 To begin civil forfeiture proceedings, the seizing
agency only needs to prove a possible connection between the
property and criminal activity.76 Sometimes this is quite useful,
68. See id. (explaining that, while criminal forfeiture certainly has its uses,
civil forfeiture is much more useful in the realm of third-party property).
69. See 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2016) (establishing procedures for the Government
to file a civil complaint against a piece of property, separate from the criminal
action).
70. See Cassella, Overview of Civil Asset Forfeiture Law, supra note 46, at
16 (explaining how civil forfeiture resembles most civil actions).
71. See § 983(a)(1)(A)(ii) (requiring the Government to file an action
against the seized property and to provide such notice as is required by law).
72. See § 983(a)(2) (providing that the owner’s claim must “(i) identify the
specific property being claimed; (ii) state the claimant’s interest in such
property; and (iii) be made under oath, subject to penalty of perjury”).
73. See generally § 983 (outlining civil forfeiture procedures); see also
Cassella, Overview of Civil Asset Forfeiture Law, supra note 46, at 16 (describing
how a civil forfeiture case moves through the usual litigation procedures).
74. See infra Part IV (detailing Virginia’s statutory provisions for civil
asset forfeiture).
75. See United States v. Cherry, 330 F.3d 658, 666 n.16 (4th Cir. 2003)
(“[T]he owner’s culpability is irrelevant in deciding whether property should be
forfeited”).
76. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(2)(B) (2012) (stating that property can be seized
based upon probable cause suggesting a direct or indirect connection to criminal
activity).
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such as when law enforcement finds marijuana farms but is
unable to find the growers themselves.77 Civil forfeiture enables
the government to seize the land and put an end to the criminal
activity without having to successfully find and prosecute the
criminals.78 However, potential for abuse exists whenever law
enforcement can seize assets without proving that the owners are
guilty of a crime, and a look at the history behind civil asset
forfeiture shows how quickly such abuses began to occur.79
C. Beginnings of Abuse
It is important to note the federal government’s original
intention behind asset forfeiture: to cripple drug dealers by
attacking their finances.80 In fact, the stated goals of civil asset
forfeiture are still to seize “guns, airplanes and cars . . . used for
drug smuggling,” to shut down marijuana farms and crack
houses, and to end companies used for fraud and Ponzi schemes.81
Unfortunately, because law enforcement was allowed to keep
seized proceeds, overzealous law enforcement officers began to
abuse the system.82 These abuses for financial gain have been
termed “policing for profit.”83
77. See § 981(a)(1)(C) (allowing the forfeiture of land connected to crimes
(such as marijuana farms) without requiring the conviction of the owners).
78. See Cassella, Overview of Civil Asset Forfeiture Law, supra note 46, at
9–10 (explaining the importance of confiscating any property connected to
criminal activity, particularly as a message to other criminals with assets to
lose).
79. See infra Part II (describing the abuses that have occurred across the
United States); see also CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 14, at 14–15 (reporting on
the widespread abuse of the civil asset forfeiture system, especially in states
that return the proceeds of confiscated assets to local law enforcement).
80. See MALCOLM, supra note 39 (“[T]he goal [of civil asset forfeiture] was
to empower federal law enforcement officials to go after the illegal profits and
ill-gotten property of drug kingpins and criminal organizations, thereby
undercutting the profit incentives of the illegal drug trade.”).
81. Cassella, Overview of Civil Asset Forfeiture Law, supra note 46, at 8.
82. See MARIAN R. WILLIAMS, JEFFERSON E. HOLCOMB, TOMISLAV V.
KOVANDZIC & SCOTT BULLOCK, POLICING FOR PROFIT (2010) (describing how, after
1984, federal agencies were given a “direct financial stake in generating
forfeiture funds,” resulting in abuses of the system by officers blurring the law
to get financial revenue).
83. DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, ABOVE THE LAW: AN INVESTIGATION OF CIVIL
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One such abuse that reached Congress’s attention was the
shooting of Donald Scott, a millionaire who owned a 250-acre
estate in Ventura County, California.84 Scott had steadfastly
refused to sell his land to the government, despite several offers
from local officials, and tensions escalated.85 On October 2, 1992,
DEA and Park Service agents shot Scott while raiding his land in
search of marijuana plants.86 Allegations quickly arose that the
search had been a pretextual attempt to seize Scott’s land.87 Park
Service agents who wanted Scott’s land had been present for
unknown reasons and had neither found marijuana plants nor
notified Ventura County Police.88 In addition, a 1993 report on
the shooting written by Michael Bradbury, the Ventura County
District Attorney, stated that “at least one of the motivating
factors in obtaining the search warrant was to forfeit the Trail’s
End Ranch [Donald Scott’s property].”89 The district attorney also
recorded that DEA agents had appraised the value of Scott’s land
and compared it to the price of other properties sold in the area. 90
He concluded:
We can find no reason why law enforcement officers who were
investigating suspected narcotics violations would have any
interest in the value of the Trail’s End Ranch or the value of
property sold in the same area other than [i]f they had a
motive to forfeit that property . . . . It is our opinion that the
most reasonable explanation is that the law enforcement
ASSET FORFEITURE IN CALIFORNIA 6 (2014).
84. See Stillman, supra note 6 (explaining how the law enforcement fiasco
surrounding Scott’s killing catalyzed Congressional reforms).
85. See id. (noting that the Park Service had repeatedly tried to buy Scott’s
land).
86. See Brenda Grantland, L.A. Forfeiture Squads Kill California
Millionaire, F.E.A.R. CHRONICLES (Nov. 1992), http://www.fear.org/scott15.html
(last visited Apr. 27, 2017) (describing the circumstances behind Scott’s death)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
87. See id. (describing the local outcry against the suspicious factors that
were present before and during the raid).
88. See id. (detailing the allegations of asset forfeiture incentives behind
the shooting of Donald Scott).
89. Michael Bradbury, Report on the Death of Donald Scott, F.E.A.R.
CHRONICLES (Mar. 31, 1993), http://www.fear.org/chron/denoce.txt (last visited
Apr. 27, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
90. See id. (noting DEA agents’ handwritten documents that recorded the
values of surrounding properties and the estimated value of Scott’s property).
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officers involved in the preparation of the search warrant were
motivated, in part, by a desire to forfeit a valuable piece of
property.91

As a result of this scandal and several others, there was an
outcry for civil asset forfeiture reform.92 Congress responded with
the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA),93 which
required the government to prove that there was a “substantial
connection between the property and the offense.”94 This allowed
innocent property owners to contest federal forfeitures with
relative success; however, under most current state laws, the
property owner still must affirmatively prove that his property
had no connection to illegal activity.95 Thus, while CAFRA helped
to reduce the level of federal forfeiture abuses and allowed more
property owners to litigate for and regain their property from the
government, it was only a stopgap measure.96 Individual state
legislatures still had to pass their own laws to provide property
owners with methods to fight against wrongful asset seizures.97
III. Various State Approaches to Civil Asset Forfeiture
A. Distributions of Seized Assets and Burdens of Proof
While states have taken varied approaches to civil asset
forfeiture, many legislative approaches are either identical or
very similar.98 Currently, law enforcement agencies in fortythree states are allowed to keep between 45% and 100% of the
91. Id.
92. See Stillman, supra note 6 (recording that the chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee decried the abusive use of civil asset forfeiture in 1997
after the Scott shooting had transpired).
93. H.R. 1658, 109th Cong. 1999–2000.
94. Id.
95. See CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 14, at 18–20 (reporting that in most
states the owner of the property must prove innocence).
96. See Cassella, Overview of Civil Asset Forfeiture Law, supra note 46, at
12 (stating that, after the passage of CAFRA allowed some relief to property
owners, administrative forfeitures decreased from 85% to 80%).
97. See Stillman, supra note 6 (detailing the different state legislative
responses to civil asset forfeiture).
98. See CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 14, at 45–150 (recording the different
state approaches to civil asset forfeiture, many of which are highly similar).
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assets seized.99 In fact, most of the states that allow law
enforcement to keep a percentage of the assets permit the
agencies to keep the full 100%. 100 Of the remaining seven states,
most put the assets seized through civil forfeiture into either the
state’s general fund or its education fund. 101 Standards of proof
for civil forfeiture vary from probable cause, as seen in North
Dakota and Massachusetts,102 to beyond a reasonable doubt in
Nebraska,103 North Carolina,104 and New Mexico.105 Most states
and the federal government, however, use the preponderance of
the evidence standard, with some providing a different standard
for real property.106
Even if a state has a higher burden of proof than
preponderance of the evidence, local law enforcement can
circumvent the burden of proof standard and take advantage of
the federal government’s standard through the practice of
equitable sharing.107 Equitable sharing, or the practice of working
in conjunction with federal agencies during the forfeiture process,
allows the state to process the forfeiture of property through
99. See id. at 25–30 (explaining that the proceeds from seized assets are
distributed back to law enforcement agencies based upon their level of
involvement in asset forfeiture programs).
100. See id. (noting that, even when the seizing agency does not keep a full
100% of forfeiture proceeds, the remainder often goes to the state’s general law
enforcement needs).
101. See, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 5822(4), 5824 (2015) (sending all
forfeiture proceeds to Maine’s general fund, with limited exceptions).
102. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-36.6 (1989) (setting the burden of proof
at forfeiture hearings at probable cause); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 47(d)
(2015) (establishing probable cause as the burden of proof).
103. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-431(4), 28-1111 (2015) (requiring the state to
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, except in gambling-related seizures,
at which point the burden is preponderance of the evidence).
104. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75D-5, 90-112 (2015) (maintaining that a
criminal conviction and proof beyond a reasonable doubt are required for all
forfeitures, with the exception of property related to racketeering).
105. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-4 (2015) (requiring a criminal conviction,
with the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, followed by a civil case at
which the standard will be clear and convincing evidence).
106. See CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 14, at 17 (recording that
twenty-seven states use the preponderance of the evidence standard and several
states use varying evidentiary standards based on the property types).
107. See id. at 28 (observing that, when property is seized through equitable
sharing, the federal government’s evidentiary standard applies).
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other channels besides state law.108 If a local law enforcement
agent wants to seize assets that fall outside of his state’s
jurisdiction, he can notify a federal agency such as the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) or Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) and have the assets seized under their
jurisdiction.109 Doing so allows local law enforcement to seize
assets that it could not otherwise take under state law110 or to
take advantage of the lower burden of proof at the federal level if
the officer works in a state that generally has a higher burden of
proof.111 States that have legalized marijuana have seen an
uptick in such cases because local law enforcement can seize
property through equitable sharing for violations of federal law,
even though the actions were perfectly legal at the state level.112
While situations exist where combined task forces of federal
and state agents are necessary,113 experts have acknowledged
108. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CRIM. DIV., GUIDE TO EQUITABLE SHARING FOR
STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 3–6 (2009) (providing regulations
for state and local agencies to participate in equitable sharing); see also Nick
Sibilla, The Shame of Equitable Sharing, SLATE (Apr. 2, 2014, 1:03 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/04/equitable
_sharing_legalized_marijuana_and_civil_forfeiture_the_scheme_that.html (last
visited Apr. 27, 2017) (explaining that local law enforcement can collaborate
with federal agencies to adopt a forfeiture case, bringing it under the purview of
federal laws and regulations) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
109. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 108, at 2 (explaining how federal
agencies can “adopt” cases or seizures so that they can apply federal
jurisdiction); see also Sallah et al., supra note 10 (detailing how a local law
enforcement officer contacted Immigrations and Customs Enforcement to aid in
the seizure of assets from a Hispanic individual).
110. See Sibilla, supra note 108 (explaining how, in states that have
legalized marijuana, state law enforcement can seize property related to
marijuana through equitable sharing because marijuana is still illegal on the
federal level).
111. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 82 (“The most reasonable explanation
is that it is in the financial interests of many state and local agencies to process
forfeitures through the federal government rather than to use their own existing
state legal framework.”).
112. See id. (recording that over the course of one year in the Central
District of California, thirty forfeiture actions were filed through equitable
sharing against property owners and over 525 marijuana dispensaries were
threatened, all under the guise of federal laws).
113. See DEP’T OF CRIM. JUST. SERV. OF VA., FORFEITED ASSET SHARING
MANUAL (2015) (explaining that task forces of two or more agencies are often
required during narcotics drug busts).
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that equitable sharing has been used far too often as a way to
avoid more restrictive state laws.114 Fortunately, as of January
2015, Attorney General Eric Holder ended most of the equitable
sharing practice, with certain limited exceptions.115 While this
will hopefully curb some of the abuses committed by state law
enforcement by ending the federal “umbrella-style” seizures,116 it
will have a minimal effect on states that already allow law
enforcement to keep most seized assets.117
B. State Protections for Innocent Owners
In all civil asset forfeiture cases, underlying concerns exist as
to how best to protect innocent owners when law enforcement
erroneously seizes their property.118 As a result of these concerns,
114. See, e.g., Sibilla, supra note 108 (explaining the litany of abuses that
equitable sharing has caused in California and other states where state laws
permit actions that are illegal on the federal level); see also Jonathan Blanks,
Eric Holder’s Asset Forfeiture Decision Won’t Stop the Widespread Abuse of
Police Power, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 19, 2015), https://newrepublic.com/article/
120799/holder-ends-most-equitable-sharing-civil-asset-forfeiture-program (last
visited Apr. 27, 2017) (reporting that criminal justice reporters, press members,
and congressmen protested to Eric Holder about the abuses seen with equitable
sharing) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
115. See Robert O’Harrow Jr., Sari Horwitz & Steven Rich, Holder Limits
Seized-Asset Sharing Process that Split Billions with Local, State Police, WASH.
POST (Jan. 16, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/holderends-seized-asset-sharing-process-that-split-billions-with-local-statepolice/2015/01/16/0e7ca058-99d4-11e4-bcfb-059ec7a93ddc_story.html
(last
visited Apr. 27, 2017) (noting that cash and vehicle seizures, which made up the
majority of equitable sharing, can no longer be shared between federal and local
agencies, with the only remaining exceptions being illegal firearms, explosives,
and materials used to make child pornography) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
116. Because Attorney General Holder terminated most equitable sharing
practices between federal and state law enforcement, local police agencies will
no longer be able to team up with federal agencies to use civil forfeiture to
intimidate individuals like marijuana growers in states where marijuana is
legal. See Sibilla, supra note 108 (reporting that the only way California law
enforcement could threaten marijuana dispensaries was by teaming up with the
DEA and prosecuting the dispensaries under federal law).
117. See Blanks, supra note 114 (“States that already allow police [to] keep
up to 100% of forfeiture proceeds will be largely unaffected by the changes
announced Friday.”).
118. See Stefan D. Cassella, The Uniform Innocent Owner Defense to Civil
Asset Forfeiture, 89 KY. L.J. 653, 658 (2000) [hereinafter Cassella, Uniform
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all states have some type of innocent owner defense.119 Innocent
owner defenses are laws that allow property owners to regain
their property in court if they can prove that they had no
connection to the crime.120 These laws came about as a result of
the 1996 Supreme Court case Bennis v. Michigan, which ruled
that no such defense constitutionally existed.121 The public and
media reacted very negatively to this ruling, prompting Congress
to incorporate an innocent owner defense into CAFRA.122 All
states subsequently established their own defenses as well.123
Despite the existence of innocent owner defenses, most states
require the contesting party to assert the defense affirmatively.124
This effectively creates a guilty until proven innocent standard
for regaining seized property.125 In fact, only six states require
the government to prove guilt in all cases, with another six states
determining the burden depending on the nature of the
property.126 Because the cases are in rem proceedings against
Innocent Owner Defense] (noting that, since the 1970s, the judiciary and
lawmakers alike had been concerned about how to adequately protect innocent
owners and co-owners).
119. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 82 (explaining that CAFRA established
an innocent owner defense for federal seizures, and that all states have passed
legislation establishing this defense as well).
120. See 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2009) (listing federal regulations for how an
innocent property owner can assert this defense to regain property).
121. See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 443 (1996) (stating that the
innocent co-owner’s interest could be terminated without due process
violations).
122. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 82 (reporting that a federal innocent
owner defense now exists for all seizure cases).
123. See id. (explaining the evolution of the innocent owner defense from the
federal level down to the state level).
124. See id. (noting that very few states require the government to first
prove that the owner is not innocent). New Mexico passed legislation in 2015
that removed the property’s innocent owner of the burden of proving innocence
at trial. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-4 (2015) (requiring the government to
prove that the owner asserting innocent had knowledge of the underlying
offense).
125. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 82 (reiterating that the property owner
must affirmatively prove that no criminal connection exists, as opposed to
criminal cases where the state has the burden to prove the criminal act).
126. See id. (listing California, Colorado, Florida, Kansas, Michigan, and
Oregon as the states where the government must prove guilt, and Alabama,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, New Mexico, and Utah as the states where the
burden depends on the property involved).
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specific property (often resulting in interesting case names such
as United States v. $557,933.39, More or Less, in U.S. Funds127 or
United States v. One 1992 Ford Mustang GT128), the law places
the owner in the position of being an advocate in favor of his own
property, instead of the position of a defendant. Despite this
phenomenon, due process protections still exist, as seen in Austin
v. United States,129 which prohibited disproportionate
forfeitures.130 And although these existing protections
theoretically apply, the Virginia State Crime Commission pointed
out that “in practice, forfeitures are almost never found to have
violated the Eighth Amendment.”131 Fourth Amendment and
Fifth Amendment due process protections also cover ownership
interests for in rem property, as the Supreme Court ruled in
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property.132
127. 287 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2002).
128. 73 F. Supp. 2d 1131 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
129. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
130. See id. (holding that the Eighth Amendment, particularly the excessive
fines clause, protects against overly harsh in rem civil forfeitures). In Austin,
the petitioner pled guilty to one count of possessing cocaine with the intent to
distribute. Id. at 604. After his conviction, the United States attempted to seize
his mobile home and auto body shop due to their connection with the crime. Id.
at 604–05. Austin argued that such a seizure would violate the Eighth
Amendment due to the seizure’s disproportionality, but both the District Court
and the Eighth Circuit disagreed, finding that the Eighth Amendment was
limited to criminal proceedings. Id. at 605. The Supreme Court overruled the
lower courts, extending the Eighth Amendment to civil proceedings and noting
that the government can punish criminals through civil, as well as criminal,
means. Id. at 611. After determining that civil asset forfeitures qualify as
punishment (particularly because the legislative history behind asset forfeiture
laws confirms their punitive nature), the Court concluded that the Excessive
Fines Clause applied to civil asset forfeiture, but declined to establish any type
of multifactor test. Id. at 620–22.
131. VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, supra note 4, at 33.
132. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43,
48–49 (1993) (holding that both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments apply to in
rem forfeiture proceedings). In James Daniel Good, Good was sentenced to one
year in jail and five years of probation after law enforcement discovered
eighty-nine pounds of marijuana and drug paraphernalia on his property. Id. at
46. Over four years later, the government seized Good’s house and land without
prior notice or a hearing prior to the termination of Good’s property rights. Id. at
47. Good filed a claim for his property alleging a lack of timeliness and a
violation of his due process rights; the District Court summarily dismissed his
claim, but the Ninth Circuit reversed in regards to the due process allegations.
Id. This created a circuit split about the application of due process in asset
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Despite these constitutional due process protections, the
property owner must still affirmatively prove innocence.133 This
weighty burden of proof has resulted in a large percentage of
property owners not even attempting to regain their property.134
Even after Congress passed CAFRA and established this defense,
there was only a 5% increase of owners contesting the seizures of
their property.135 Of course, the burden of proof on the innocent
owner comprises only one part of this situation. There are
undoubtedly many instances in which the owner was indeed
involved in criminal activity and chose not to waste his time or
resources attempting to get the property back.136
There are legitimate law enforcement goals for allowing the
burden to be placed on the owner, such as “when [the
government] can prove that the property was involved in a crime,
but cannot prove who the wrongdoer was.”137 This burden,
however, also creates negative societal effects with race- and
forfeiture proceedings and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 48. The
Court disagreed with the Government’s argument that only the Fourth
Amendment applies to such proceedings, citing Soidal v. Cook County, 506 U.S.
56, 70 (1992), in establishing that property seizure implicates both the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments. Id. at 49–50. Analyzing the proceedings under the
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) balancing test, the Court noted
Good’s weighty interest in his property and the dangers of ex parte proceedings
when the Government seeks to seize such property, and decided that the
Government had no pressing need that could justify ex parte seizures in the civil
forfeiture context, absent exigent circumstances. Id. at 55–56. That being said,
the Supreme Court distinguished between an ex parte seizure of real property
that is necessarily stationary and personal property that can be moved or
hidden, implying that ex parte seizures may be justified through exigency when
dealing with personal property that the defendant can conceal. Id. 60–61. The
Court also ruled that any timing requirements, such as statutes of limitations,
were internal proceedings and did not violate timeliness concerns so long as the
statute was satisfied. Id. at 65.
133. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 82 (reporting that, in most states, the
property owner must still prove innocent owner status, with the exception of a
few jurisdictions).
134. See VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, supra note 4, at 81 (recording that, in
Virginia alone, 61% of owners defaulted on their property and 28% signed a
settlement or waiver relinquishing their rights).
135. See Cassella, Overview of Asset Forfeiture Law, supra note 46, at 12
(providing a DEA estimate of a decrease in uncontested forfeitures from 85% to
80% after the passage of CAFRA).
136. See id. (stating that many times individuals simply do not contest
forfeiture for unknown reasons ranging from guilt to lack of resources).
137. Id. at 17.
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class-discrimination implications.138 A study by The Washington
Post reported that out of 400 contested cases, most individuals
faced with civil asset forfeiture were minorities.139 To explain this
finding, some experts posit that less scrupulous law enforcement
officers target individuals who are less likely to fight in court to
get their assets back.140 These experts further note that poorer
citizens were also more likely to be targeted than well-off
persons.141 A 2009 study examining the connection between law
enforcement’s use of civil asset forfeiture and the socioeconomic
or racial status of individuals whose property was seized
discovered a number of disturbing trends.142 Specifically in
regards to the targeting of the apparently indigent, the study
concluded that law enforcement officers used civil asset forfeiture
more frequently in areas with large amounts of income
disparity.143 Additionally, the study found other factors that
increase the disparate impact civil forfeiture has on minorities,
such as the propensity for minorities to carry larger amounts of
cash than white individuals,144 the propensity for minorities to

138. See Stillman, supra note 6 (listing concerns with the number of
minorities and indigent who fall victim to civil asset forfeiture, in comparison to
non-minorities).
139. See Sallah et al., supra note 10 (noting that such a study was necessary
because the Bureau of Justice does not keep race-related statistics in regard to
asset forfeitures on either the state or federal level).
140. See Stillman, supra note 6 (stating that law enforcement officers often
target minorities for possible asset forfeiture with the implication that there is a
higher success rate for keeping the seized assets).
141. See id. (pointing out that often people faced with civil asset forfeiture
are too poor to fight back or they are immigrants who wish to stay out of court).
142. See Mary Murphy, Race and Civil Asset Forfeiture: A Disparate Impact
Hypothesis, 16 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 77, 89–90 (2010) (describing how law
enforcement targets minorities and those of low social class (citing Ronald
Helms & S. E. Costanza, Race, Politics and Drug Law Enforcement: An Analysis
of Civil Asset Forfeiture Patterns Across U.S. Counties, 19 POLICING & SOC’Y 1
(2009))).
143. See id. at 94 (“The research indicated that the greater the income
disparity in the area, the more likely the law enforcement agencies would use
civil asset forfeiture.” (citations omitted)).
144. See id. (describing racism in banking and explaining how, because
national banks are less likely to have branches in minority neighborhoods,
minorities are more likely to be carrying around large amounts of cash for
innocent reasons than non-minorities are).
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consent to vehicles searches out of fear of the police,145 and the
lack of minority access to legal counsel in comparison to whites.146
IV. Virginia’s Civil Asset Forfeiture Laws
The problems and concerns with civil asset forfeiture
discussed above have been seen on the federal level and in most
states.147 However, almost every state has enacted their own civil
asset forfeiture provisions and, thus, has unique problems
associated with those laws.148 The remainder of this Note focuses
on Virginia laws and the issues that arise out of them. As
Virginia has different civil asset forfeiture laws for personal
property and real property, this Note analyzes those laws
separately. This Note also compares and contrasts common
abuses associated with those laws.
A. Property Generally
1. Overview of Virginia Laws
Under current Virginia law, assets forfeited for drug-related
reasons are recycled through the system and returned to the
confiscating agency, while assets forfeited for non-drug-related
purposes are sent to the Commonwealth’s Literary Fund.149 This
145. See id. at 95 (pointing out that “racial minorities may consent to
searches because they feel threatened, not because they truly are comfortable
with the police officer’s search”).
146. See id. at 96 (stating that, to properly exercise one’s legal rights in
court against the government, contact with experts in the field is an absolute
necessity, and non-minorities are 37% more likely than minorities to possess
such contact (citing Erin York Cornwell & Benjamin Cornwell, Access to
Expertise as a Form of Social Capital: An Examination of Race- and Class-based
Disparities in Network Ties to Experts, 51 SOC. PERSP. 853, 856 (2008))).
147. See Sallah et al., supra note 10 (listing these concerns as appearing on
a national level among most or all of the states).
148. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 82 (describing how state-enacted asset
forfeiture laws vary widely from each other in some areas, while remaining very
similar in others).
149. See VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, supra note 4, at 14 (relating the current
state of the law in Virginia and justifying current legislation as a way to
recompense the government and law enforcement agencies for costs sustained
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is a somewhat recent change: before 1991, all seized assets went
to the Literary Fund and none went to law enforcement
agencies.150 Drug-related seizures comprise only one area in
which law enforcement can seize assets under Virginia law; many
other crimes—for example, production or possession of child
pornography or the sale and distribution of counterfeit
cigarettes—can also result in seized assets.151 However, most
assets that Virginia law enforcement seizes involve the
production, possession, or distribution of narcotics or other
drugs.152 In 2015, the Literary Fund received $339,964 from
non-drug-related asset forfeiture, whereas law enforcement
agencies received $5,600,969 from their drug seizures.153 Virginia
law does require that certain assets be connected with certain
crimes, but for the most part the laws are similar to other states’
legislation.154 Within twenty-one days of seizure, the
Commonwealth’s Attorney must file a notice of seizure with the
circuit court, at which point the clerk of court mails a notice of
seizure to the affected property owner.155 The property owner
must then invoke his right to contest the seizure by filing an
while prosecuting crime).
150. See VA. CONST. art. V, § 8 (allowing drug-related assets to be
“distributed by law for the purpose of promoting law enforcement,” instead of
going directly to the Literary Fund).
151. See VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, supra note 4, at 38–40 (listing the
following offenses as sufficient for asset forfeiture: terrorism, computer crimes,
unlawful sale of cigarettes, money laundering, drug-offenses, gambling, use of
cars to transport stolen goods or for prostitution-related reasons, and the use of
property in connection with the abduction or exploitation of children); see also
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386 (2012) (codifying the various criminal actions that
may result in property forfeiture).
152. See VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, supra note 4, at 75–77 (showing that law
enforcement confiscated approximately 16.5 times more property related to drug
offenses than for other charges).
153. See id. at 12–13 (giving the above figures and comparing the $339,964
that the Literary Fund received from asset forfeiture to the $88,771,048 that the
Literary Fund received from other sources).
154. See id. at 88 (stating that Virginia is similar to thirty-three other states
as well as the federal government in allowing forfeiture without a criminal
conviction). Some states take a “blended” approach, in which conviction is only
sometimes necessary, usually for certain crimes. Id.
155. See VA CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.3 (2012) (requiring the seizing agency to
notify an attorney for the Commonwealth, who is then required to file a seizure
notice with the clerk of the circuit court that has jurisdiction over the matter).
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answer to the complaint, at which point he has the option of
choosing a bench trial or trial by jury.156
Upon the initial seizure of property, the law enforcement
agency must state a substantial connection between the property
and criminal activity in the forfeiture complaint filed against the
property.157 Virginia statutes do not define “substantial
connection,” but the phrase has generally been interpreted in
Virginia to mean probable cause.158 At that point, the burden
shifts to the property owner to prove to the Department of
Criminal Justice Services (DCJS), by a preponderance of the
evidence, that either no such connection exists or that he had no
knowledge of the fact that his property was being used for
criminal ends.159 If the DCJS finds in favor of the property owner,
it either returns the property to the owner or orders the State
Treasury to pay the owner the value of his interest in the
property.160 If the owner fails to convince the DCJS, he can take
the case to trial.161 If the claimant wins his suit, he is entitled to
reimbursement for attorney’s fees.162 No state provision exists to
156. See id. (stating that an owner must file an answer within thirty days
establishing the nature of his claim, his ownership interest, and the reasons or
exemptions he is pleading before the court). Certain exemptions exist, mostly for
innocent owners, but this list is not exhaustive. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.8
(2012) (listing exemptions including the owner not knowing or having reason to
know that his property was being used in an illegal manner).
157. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.1 (2012) (requiring that the
Commonwealth’s Attorney state “in general terms the grounds for forfeiture of
the property”); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.22 (2014) (stating that a
substantial connection to drug crimes must be proven). Virginia has not defined
the burden of proof for initial seizure of non-drug related property, but the
Virginia State Crime Commission has interpreted this statute to apply to all
asset seizures. See VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, supra note 4, at 34 (listing
probable cause as the standard of proof for initial seizure).
158. See VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, supra note 4, at 34 (“In general, a
probable cause standard, or something beyond mere suspicion, must be used.”).
159. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2‐386.10(A) (2016) (requiring a preponderance
of the evidence standard); see also VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, supra note 4, at 91
(pointing out that most states either use a preponderance of the evidence
standard like Virginia or incorporate it into their blended approaches).
160. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.10(A) (2016).
161. Id.
162. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2‐386.12(B) (2012) (stating that, if a claimant
chooses to contest his property’s seizure and successfully does so in court, he is
entitled to “reasonable attorney’s fees and costs” to be paid by the
Commonwealth out of the state’s Criminal Fund).
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appoint counsel to indigent owners of property; they must hire an
attorney out of their own pocket or seek pro bono counsel.163 Over
the past four years, twenty-two individuals have successfully won
such suits in Virginia and have been reimbursed for a total sum
of $22,478 from Virginia’s Criminal Fund.164 If the claimant loses
his case, or does not attempt to win back his property, the DCJS
places 10% of the funds in the Asset Sharing Administrative
Fund and returns the rest to participating law enforcement
agencies.165 The law enforcement agency does not necessarily
keep all 90%, as the local Commonwealth Attorney’s office can
receive shares of up to 45% if the asset was real estate or went to
trial.166 According to the DJCS, currency and vehicles make up
the majority of seizures, at 89%.167
2. Concerns with Virginia’s Personal Property Regulations
Many of the problems with civil asset forfeiture that have
been seen nationwide exist in Virginia as well; in addition,
163. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2‐386 (2012) (listing no provisions for
appointing counsel). Federal law does allow the court to appoint counsel to
individuals during asset forfeiture cases, but only when they are also
defendants in ongoing criminal proceedings. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(b) (2016)
(providing that the court may appoint counsel to an indigent defendant who
already has counsel appointed for the criminal charge).
164. See VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, supra note 4, at 64 (reporting data
obtained from the Office of the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of
Virginia). The number of individuals successfully winning litigated cases and
being reimbursed by the state for expenses was five in 2012, six in 2013, four in
2014, and seven in 2015 (as of late October). Id.
165. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2‐386.14(A1) (2012) (establishing the Asset
Sharing Administrative Fund of the DCJS as a resource to pay for any expenses
incurred through the operation and management of the asset sharing program).
166. See id. § 19.2‐386.14(B) (allowing the DCJS to distribute either the
forfeited asset or the proceeds from the sale of said asset to the law enforcement
agency/agencies that contributed to the seizure, based upon the degree of
participation). If more than one agency was involved, DCJS retains final control
over determining the share distribution. See id. (providing that DCJS can
distribute assets based upon percentages of agency contribution to the seizure).
167. See VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, supra note 4, at 76 (revealing data from
reporting agencies that showed currency seizures as being the most frequent
(comprising 9,034 of 14,171 seizures during 2010–2015, or 64%) and vehicle
seizures following in a distant second (making up 3,479 of 14,171 seizures
during 2010–2015, or 25%)).
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unique concerns also exist due to Virginia’s particular forfeiture
laws.168 These issues are (1) the use of an abusive police waiver
system, in conjunction with the lack of appointed counsel for
indigent property owners,169 and (2) a profound lack of oversight
over law enforcement spending of asset forfeiture funds.170
a. The Virginia Waiver System and the Lack of Appointed Counsel
The first glaring problem of Virginia’s forfeiture program is
that, while Virginia maintains a waiver system, it fails to
adequately protect property owners by granting them the
protections of counsel throughout these proceedings.171 Virginia,
along with several other states, uses a waiver system in which
law enforcement is permitted to pressure property owners into
signing waivers that forfeit their ownership rights to their
property.172 A police officer can tell the property owner why he
suspects a crime was committed and then offer to let him go if he
gives up the property—which, in Virginia, is most often cash.173
These highway negotiations take place outside the presence of
counsel and target minorities, many of whom are very afraid of
government-related threats.174 Law enforcement can also offer
direct settlements to property owners, offering to return a
percentage of the seized money if the owner gives up the rest of
it.175 Without being melodramatic, this system of threatening
168. Infra Part IV.A.2.
169. Infra Part IV.A.2.a.
170. Infra Part IV.A.2.b.
171. See VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, supra note 4, at 99, 102 (noting that
Virginia uses a waiver system, in contrast to states like Texas that ban the
practice of allowing law enforcement to request waivers from citizens).
172. See id. at 81 (noting that 28% of cases were settled by some type of
waiver or settlement).
173. See id. at 76 (reporting that cash was seized 64% of the time); see also
Sallah et al., supra note 10 (relating a case in which the interrogating officer
pressured the owner of $25,180 that had been seized to sign a waiver,
threatening drug charges and jail time if the waiver was not signed).
174. See Sallah et al., supra note 10 (reporting on the case of a Hispanic
church treasurer in Sterling, Virginia, who signed a waiver giving up the
church’s money after law enforcement called Immigrations and Customs
Enforcement and interrogated him on the scene).
175. See id. (telling the story of Mandrel Stuart, a restaurant owner who
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arrest unless the citizen hands over money is closer to highway
robbery than actual good faith policing.
The problems of the waiver system are magnified when the
owner is indigent, cannot afford counsel, and is being pressured
by law enforcement officers and the Commonwealth’s Attorneys
to sign away his property.176 Given all that is required to contest
forfeiture—the initial filings of documents that assert ownership
rights, the discovery process, the pre-trial motions procedure, the
trial—a person without an attorney can hardly be expected to
contest the forfeiture on his own.177 Add the factor of a uniformed
officer threatening criminal charges unless the indigent owner
signs away his property, and it becomes clear why so few
individuals contest forfeitures in Virginia.178 Virginia does
provide for the eventual recompense of attorney’s fees to
individuals that successfully contest their property seizures in
court,179 but this does nothing to help a person who lacks the
funds to hire an attorney in the first place, or who is pressured
into signing a waiver form.
Even the Virginia State Crime Commission (VSCC)
expressed strong concern with this system.180 While it did not
address the lack of appointed representation, the VSCC opined
that the waiver system outside of the presence of counsel “can
raise the appearance of unfair dealing or coercion” and noted that
had $17,550 seized during a routine traffic stop). The state offered him a 50%
settlement, which he refused. Stuart eventually won the case. See id. (relaying
the above facts and pointing out that Stuart lost his restaurant due to how long
it took to get his money back).
176. Compare Cornwell et al., supra note 146, at 856 (explaining that
minorities often simply do not possess the financial capital or the connections to
properly hire representation), and Sallah et al., supra note 10 (reporting on how
the vast majority of seizures affect minorities), with VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N,
supra note 4, at 99, 102 (admitting that abuses of the waiver system have been
clearly seen in other states, and providing the example of Texas, which forbade
any property seizure-related officer negotiation with property owners).
177. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.12 (2015) (entitling a successful
contestant to attorney’s fees and costs after the trial, but necessarily requiring
any owner or attorney to front the expenses until that point).
178. See VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, supra note 4, at 81 (reporting that less
than 1% of civil forfeitures resulted in a trial).
179. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.12 (1991).
180. See VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, supra note 4, at 102 (recommending that
the use of waivers be prohibited).
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there are reports of abuses in other states where this system was
used.181 In fact, it recommended that the waiver system be
abolished as a whole, if only to restore public faith in Virginian
policing.182
b. Lack of Oversight in Agency Expenditure of Asset Forfeiture
Proceeds
A second problem exists in states like Virginia that return
most of the forfeited assets to law enforcement: frequently, the
state exercises limited to no oversight as to the expenditure of
these funds.183 News agencies like The Washington Post have
documented many instances where local law enforcement has
treated asset forfeiture revenue as a windfall to be spent on
whatever it desires—not just law enforcement-related needs.184
One police chief, after admitting that there was no oversight to
how his department spends forfeiture funds, said that they
usually decided to spend on the money on things that were “nice
to have” and that they “try not to use it on things that they need
to depend on . . . . it’s kinda like pennies from Heaven, you know,
it gets you a toy or something that you need.”185 Toys are an apt
analogy—in 2012, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts’ State
Auditor released a report showing that the Worcester County
District Attorney’s office expended over $56,000 of forfeiture
181. See id. (recommending the abolition of the waiver system and noting a
lack of public faith in the current asset forfeiture system).
182. Id.
183. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 82 (decrying the practice of returning
forfeited assets back to the confiscating agencies, and noting that many agencies
use such funds as an opportunity to “pad their budgets”).
184. See Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Steven Rich & Shelly Tan, Asset Seizures
Fuel
Police
Spending,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
11,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/10/11/asset-seizures-fuelpolice-spending/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2017) (quoting a former director of the
Justice Department’s asset forfeiture program as saying that it appears that
asset forfeiture is becoming a “free floating slush fund” for police agencies) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
185. LastWeekTonight, Civil Forfeiture: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver
(HBO), YOUTUBE (Oct. 5, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3kEpZW
GgJks (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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funds without proper documentation (invoices, receipts, or
records of where the purchases went).186
Virginia has seen its own share of scandals when it comes to
spending forfeiture funds.187 In 2012, Middlesex Sheriff Guy
Abbott faced trial over twenty-five counts of embezzlement and
misuse of funds in connection with civil asset forfeiture.188 During
the trial, testimony emerged showing that Abbott had used asset
forfeiture funds to buy cars and boats, including an expensive
boat used by the Navy SEALs, as well as bonuses for staff and
non-training meals.189 However, Abbott’s eventual convictions
came down to instances where he had solicited bribes from the
Middlesex Chief Deputy, Michael Sampson II, and the Middlesex
186. See Suzanne M. Bump, Official Audit Report, COM. OF MASS. OFFICE OF
STATE AUDITOR (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.mass.gov/auditor/docs/audits/
2013/201212623j.pdf (noting that one of these undocumented purchases was a
$985 Zamboni machine used for resurfacing ice rinks). The State Auditor went
on to pointedly state that “we could not find where this item is located or what
law enforcement purpose it serves.” Id.; see also Renee C. Lee, Montgomery DA
Says Funds Used for Margarita Machine at Cook-Off, HOUSTON CHRON. (Mar.
18, 2008, 5:30AM), http://www.chron.com/neighborhood/humble-news/article/
Montgomery-DA-says-funds-used-for-liquor-at-1757341.php (last visited Apr.
27, 2017) (reporting that the Montgomery County District Attorney used
forfeiture funds to buy liquor, kegs, and a margarita machine for an office cookoff party, chalking up the expenditure as a law enforcement expense) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
187. See, e.g., Virginia Sheriff Bribed Police with Asset Forfeiture Funds,
INST. FOR JUST. (Aug. 25, 2012), http://ij.org/action-post/virginia-sheriff-bribedpolice-with-asset-forfeiture-funds/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2017) (reporting that
Guy Abbott, a Virginia sheriff, was charged with twenty-five felonies including
eighteen counts of misusing forfeiture funds).
188. See Matt Sabo, Former Middlesex Sheriff Guilty on Two Bribery
Counts, DAILY PRESS (Aug. 15, 2012), http://articles.dailypress.com/2012-0815/news/dp-nws-middlesex-abbott-trial-day5-wrap-0816-20120815_1_sheriffguy-abbott-judge-paul-f-sheridan-bribery-conviction (last visited Apr. 27, 2017)
(stating that, while the district attorney threw out three charges against Abbott,
and the court dismissed or found Abbott not guilty on twenty other charges, he
was still convicted on two counts of bribing officers with asset forfeiture funds)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
189. See Eric Gillard, Second Day of Trial of Former Middlesex County
Sheriff Focuses on Procurement of Items, DAILY PRESS (Aug. 10, 2012),
http://articles.dailypress.com/2012-08-10/news/dp-nws-middlesex-abbott-trialday2wrap-0811-20120810_1_guy-abbott-nova-marine-david-bushey (last visited
Apr. 27, 2017) (noting testimony from David Bushey, the current sheriff, stating
that he would have to track down these items, and Betty Bray, the Middlesex
County Treasurer, saying that she “[didn’t] think they should be paying for
[meals and bonuses]”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
THE

CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE IN VIRGINIA

1327

Sheriff’s Lieutenant, James Ellis.190 In both instances, Abbott
paid the men using forfeiture funds and then asked for a portion
of it back.191 In Ellis’s case, Abbott paid him a bonus using
forfeiture money, then later asked for money back, and advised
him to report the money that Ellis paid him back as “overtime”
working for the Sheriff’s Office, so that Ellis could get reimbursed
as well.192 This allowed both Abbott and Ellis to get payoffs from
the system without troublesome red tape—all because of their
handy asset forfeiture fund at the Sheriff’s Office.193 However,
Abbott’s convictions were later reversed over uncertainties about
whether Abbott’s state of mind fulfilled all the elements of the
bribery statute, or whether he instead acted in a merely
questionable manner based upon a career of operating without
proper oversight.194 Regardless of whether Abbott acted in a truly
criminal manner or not, this case would not have even occurred
and “torn [the local community] into factions”195 if the state had
implemented oversight procedures.
The Virginia State Crime Commission (VSCC) itself has
acknowledged that law enforcement needs oversight to ensure
proper expenditure of funds.196 Its 2015 report stated that “if not
properly overseen or monitored, direct funding of law
190. See Sabo, supra note 188 (relating a statement from Judge Paul F.
Sheridan that both Sampson and Ellis felt “uncomfortable” with what Abbott
was doing and that Ellis “knew it wasn’t right”).
191. See Amanda Kerr, Testimony Details Former Middlesex Sheriff’s
Alleged Misuse of Funds, DAILY PRESS (Aug. 13, 2012), http://articles.daily
press.com/2012-08-13/news/dp-nws-middlesex-abbott-trial-day3wrap-0814-2012
0813_1_misuse-or-misappropriation-middlesex-sheriff-guy-abbott-asset-forfeiture
(last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (stating that Abbott paid Sampson and Ellis $1,900
and $100 from forfeiture funds, respectively, then asked for the two men to pay
him back approximately $1,220–1,250 combined) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
192. See Sabo, supra note 188 (describing how Abbott coached Ellis to gain
back the money that Abbott solicited from him).
193. See Kerr, supra note 191 (noting that all these bribery instances began
with Abbott paying off employees with asset forfeiture funds).
194. See Gillard, supra note 189 (reporting Judge Sheridan’s statements
that he felt uncomfortable convicting Abbott based upon unspoken agreements
between Abbott and the two employees that Assistant Attorney General
Shannon Dion said felt compelled to comply with Abbott’s requests).
195. Id.
196. See VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, supra note 4, at 29 (noting that abuses
have occurred elsewhere in regards to the spending of such funds).
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enforcement through asset forfeiture can lead to inappropriate
purchases.”197 While the VSCC stated that it did not discover a
systemic pattern of improper expenditures in Virginia, it
acknowledged that no statewide recording of expenditure existed
and that when it requested information from law enforcement
agencies and Commonwealth’s Attorneys’ Offices, a significant
percentage did not even respond.198 In addition, while the
Department of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) collects
“comprehensive” information for large forfeitures relating to drug
crimes, for other forfeitures such information is not collected.199
For drug-related seizures, agencies must submit reports
regarding how much money is in their asset forfeiture fund and
an itemized list of how such funds are spent.200 However, for
non-drug-related seizures, or drug-related seizures of less than
$500, such reports are not required.201 This lack of data-reporting
and oversight is unacceptable when the state is dealing with the
personal assets of its own citizens.
B. Real Property
The above-cited problems with Virginia’s system apply to all
forfeitures of property in Virginia.202 While Virginian law
enforcement usually seizes personal property such as cash or
cars, it does occasionally seize real property.203 This subpart
discusses (1) why real property needs more protections than
personal property, (2) Virginia’s existing protections for real
197. Id.
198. See id. at 67 (stating that seventeen “primary law enforcement
agencies” and twenty-one Commonwealth’s Attorney’s Offices did not respond).
199. See id. at 72 (explaining that balance sheets, such as those required for
drug-related funds, are not required of non-drug related funds).
200. See id. at 73 (noting that the agencies must report 1) the beginning
balance of their drug-related forfeiture funds, 2) the balance at the end of the
fiscal year, and 3) how these funds were spent).
201. See id. at 86 (“Data for non-drug related [asset forfeiture] is not
captured in a reliable, transparent manner like drug-related [asset forfeiture].”).
202. Supra Part IV.A.
203. See VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, supra note 4, at 79 (reporting that
Virginia rarely seizes real property compared to how often it seizes cash or
vehicles).
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property, and (3) further protections that Virginia should
implement.204
1. Uniqueness of Real Property
The personhood theory of property states that the identity of
an individual can become bound up in a particular item, thus
giving the item an irreplaceable value inherent to its
uniqueness.205 Real property often falls within the category of
personhood property, due to the effect that growing up in a house
or on a piece of land can have upon a person’s identity.206
Renowned property scholar Margaret Jane Radin divided up
property into two different categories: personal and fungible.207
She referred to irreplaceable items (such as a house) as personal
property, whereas money is fungible property held purely as an
instrument of value.208 While Radin conducted a very detailed
analysis of different types of property,209 for the purposes of
clarity this Note focuses on the accepted doctrine that courts
generally consider real property as being unique and
irreplaceable.210

204. Infra Parts IV.B.1–3.
205. See Radin, supra note 26, at 960 (1982) (reflecting upon the significance
of certain objects to the identity of their owners).
206. See id. at 959 (referencing houses as common items that people “feel
are almost a part of themselves”).
207. See id. at 961 (referring to property, such as houses or wedding rings
that are bound up with one’s identity, as personal property, in contrast to
property “held purely instrumentally,” which would be fungible property).
208. See id. at 960 (differentiating between irreplaceable personal property,
such as houses or rings, and replaceable property, such as money or cars on a
dealer’s lot).
209. See id. at 987 (noting that personal items such as wedding rings or
photo albums can also develop an individual’s personhood much like a house
can).
210. See, e.g., Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. E. A. Breeden, Inc., 756 S.E.2d 420, 464
(Va. 2014) (pointing out that the court often grants injunctions when real
property is concerned because “the violation of a real property interest is
deemed irreparable and the owner [sic] protected in the enjoyment of his
property whether his interest be sentimental or pecuniary” (citing Levisa Coal
Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 662 S.E.2d 44, 54 (Va. 2008) (quoting Boerner v.
McAllister, 89 S.E.2d 23, 25 (Va. 1955))).
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2. Varying State Safeguards for Real Property

While states vary widely in their procedures for civilly
forfeiting real property,211 several have recognized the necessity
for heightened requirements because of the uniqueness of real
property.212 Virginia’s laws governing this issue occupy a unique
place among the fifty states, taking up a hybrid position on the
matter.213 On one hand, Virginia’s standard of proof regarding
forfeiture of real property remains the same as that required to
forfeit other property.214 Virginia’s lack of recognition of the
unique value of real property keeps it on the same level as most
other states.215 On the other hand, Virginia has a specific statute
governing the forfeiture of real property involved in drug
transactions: VA. CODE § 19.2-386.22.216 This statute requires
that the drug allegations associated with the property be severe
enough that a conviction would result in a minimum punishment
of five years in prison.217
This provision in Virginia law safeguards against some of the
most egregious civil asset forfeiture abuses seen in other
211. Compare, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.410(1)(j) (2012) (applying a
clear and convincing evidence standard to real property forfeiture), with
Robbins v. Kentucky, 336 S.W.3d 60, 64–65 (Ky. 2011) (requiring only a “slight
evidence of traceability” to seize non-real property), and N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 19-03.1-36.6 (1989) (mandating only probable cause for the government to
initiate forfeiture proceedings, applied across the board to all types of property).
212. While many states are currently reforming their civil asset forfeiture
laws, the ones with current provisions specifically protecting real property are
Alabama, Kentucky, Maine, and California. See ALA. CODE § 20-2-93(h) (1990)
(requiring the government to bear the burden of proof when the asset is real
property); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.410(1)(j) (2012) (requiring clear and
convincing evidence to forfeit real property); ME. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 5821(7)(A),
5822(3) (1987) (providing that the government must prove knowledge or consent
on the part of the owner or family members to forfeit the family’s primary
residence); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11488.4(i) (1994) (mandating a
criminal conviction before real property can be seized).
213. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.22 (2014) (establishing specific
protections for real property related to drug transactions).
214. See VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, supra note 4, at 91 (stating the applicable
burden of proof for all civil forfeitures in Virginia).
215. See id. (observing that thirty-three other states use the same burden of
proof).
216. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.22 (2014).
217. Id.
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states.218 By having this statute in place specifically for drugrelated forfeitures, Virginia prevents the loss of one’s home for a
minor drug offense, as has been frequently seen in other states
such as Pennsylvania, where innocent owners have lost their
residences after a relative made a small drug sale.219 While this is
certainly a step in the right direction, Virginia’s protections for
real property are still vastly less than those of California, for
example, which require an actual conviction before one’s home or
land can be taken.220
3. Recommended Protections for Real Property
Real property protections can be added with a minimal effect
to Virginia law enforcement because, compared to other types of
property seizures, real property occupies a very small portion of
Virginia’s asset forfeiture programs.221 According to VSCC’s most
recent data, “property”222 seizures comprised only 36 of the 14,171
seizures that took place from 2010 to September 8, 2015.223 In
2014, real estate seizures only occurred twice.224 Exact values for
the real property seizures were not provided, but they
undoubtedly accounted for only a small portion of the $31,167,594
of asset forfeiture funds that Virginia returned to state and local
law enforcement agencies in the years 2010–2015.225 Given the
218. See id. (allowing the owner or innocent co-owner of real property to
retain that property, even if there was a slight criminal drug connection to it).
219. See Brown, supra note 25 (relating the story of a Philadelphia family
that lost its home after the son was caught selling $40 worth of drugs); see also
Thompson, supra note 27 (telling the story of another family that had its home
seized in conjunction with accusations that the husband was selling painkillers
which he legally owned due to an injured back).
220. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11488.4(i) (1994) (protecting an
owner’s interest in real property by requiring that the owner actually be
convicted of a crime before the asset can be seized).
221. See VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, supra note 4, at 79 (listing only two
seizures of real estate in 2014).
222. See id. at 77 (showing the other categories besides “property” as
currency (9,034 seizures), vehicles (3,479 seizures), electronics (610 seizures),
jewelry (291 seizures), firearms (251 seizures), boats (16 seizures), and other
(454 seizures)).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 79.
225. See id. at 75 (totaling the amount of asset forfeiture proceeds returned
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irreplaceable nature of real property to its owners, no excuse
exists as to why further real property protections should not be
added to the current system.226
V. Proposed Solutions to Virginia’s Civil Asset Forfeiture
Programs
At this point, this Note’s analysis of the current civil
forfeiture system in Virginia ends, and the question arises: What
should be done to correct the demonstrated problems? Both the
Virginia House of Delegates and the Virginia State Crime
Commission have suggested their own answers.227 These shall be
addressed below, followed by a look at recent reforms and a
proposal for further reform.228
A. Legislative Efforts
In 2014, two reform bills were introduced into the Virginia
House of Delegates: HB 1287 and HB 1468.229 On September 23,
2014, Delegate Mark Cole introduced HB 1287, which established
that any civil forfeiture proceedings be stayed until the owner of
the assets had been convicted and had exhausted all appeals.230
On December 30, 2014, Delegate Robert G. Marshall filed another
bill, HB 1468, which created a cause of action for anyone who had
to agencies in the past decade).
226. See supra Part IV.B (describing the need for real property protections,
and how such protections would have a minimal impact on law enforcement’s
revenue).
227. Infra Part V.A–B.
228. Infra Part V.
229. HB 1287 Forfeiture of Property Used in Connection with Commission of
Crimes; Conviction Required, LEGIS. INFO. SYS., http://lis.virginia.gov/cgibin/legp604.exe?151+sum+HB1287 (last visited Apr. 27, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
230. The co-patrons of the bill were: Scott A. Surovell (chief co-patron),
Richard L. Anderson, Jeffrey L. Campbell, Betsy B. Carr, Peter F. Farrell,
Hyland F. “Buddy” Fowler, Jr., Daun S. Hester, Timothy D. Hugo, Terry G.
Kilgore, Dave A. LaRock, James M. LeMunyon, L. Scott Lingamfelter, Robert G.
Marshall, Jennifer L. McClellan, John M. O’Bannon, III, Robert D. Orrock, Sr.,
Brena L. Pogge, David I. Ramadan, Sam Rasoul, and R. Lee Ware). Id. HB 1287
only had one Senate patron, Charles W. Carrico, Sr. Id.
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property seized by the state and was acquitted, had the case
dismissed, or otherwise was not charged and convicted.231 The
subcommittee recommended that HB 1468 be incorporated into
HB 1287, and the Courts of Justice did so on January 28, 2015. 232
The final draft of the legislation retained the body of HB 1287,
with additional provisions that the property could only be
forfeited absent a conviction if the forfeiture composed part of a
plea agreement, or if a year passed after the seizure and the
owner had still failed to submit a written demand for the
property.233
The Virginia House of Delegates passed HB 1287 by a vote of
92–6 and sent it on to the Virginia Senate.234 It was there that
the bill met its demise, with the Senate Finance Committee
deciding not to approve it and instead voting 9–5 to send the bill
on to the Virginia State Crime Commission (VSCC) for
analysis.235
B. Virginia State Crime Commission Recommendations
The VSCC considered the bill and conducted an in-depth
analysis of Virginia’s civil asset forfeiture, ultimately refusing to
231. HB 1468 Asset Forfeiture; Civil Action, LEGIS. INFO. SYS.,
http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?151+sum+HB1468 (last visited Apr. 6,
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
232. See id. (noting that the bill had been handed down to the Criminal Law
Subcommittee of the House Courts of Justice).
233. See id. (reporting that the House read HB 1287 three times (January
30, February 2, and February 3, 2015) before passing the bill).
234. See Morgan White, Asset Forfeiture Reforms Pass the House, CAP. NEWS
SERV. (Feb. 6, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.fredericksburg.com/news/local/assetforfeiture-reforms-pass-the-house/article_b9a49cec-b595-5271-85f91444e3fba29e.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2017) (detailing the passage of the bill
and noting that Senator Charles W. Carrico, whose identical Senate bill, SB
684, had failed in the Senate in January, co-sponsored this bill as well) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
235. See Patrick Wilson, Senate Committee Kills Police Asset Forfeiture
Reform Bill, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Feb. 18, 2015), http://pilotonline.com/news/
government/politics/virginia/senate-committee-kills-police-asset-forfeiture-bill/
article_77883941-f509-50cb-b222-74a6777a4d62.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017)
(reporting that, while the bill had passed the Senate Courts of Justice
Committee 11–2, the Finance Committee killed the bill on what Delegate Mark
Cole referred to as pretextual grounds) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
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endorse the bill.236 However, the VSCC issued a number of
recommendations for immediate changes to the system, as well as
items for consideration.237
1. Recommendations
The VSCC’s recommendations encompassed a wide variety of
issues and potential issues seen with the current system, most of
which hinged upon transparency.238 The VSCC’s first relevant
recommendation was that the waiver system be abolished, as it
was prone to abuse and retained the appearance of coercion.239
Second, due to a lack of public faith in Virginia’s civil forfeiture
system, the Commission advocated that the DCJS be required to
submit annual reports on every seizure, drug-related or not,
which would be available for public use.240 Third, the report
acknowledged a dearth of data regarding non-drug related
seizures and suggested an across-the-board requirement for law
enforcement agencies to submit information on all seizures
conducted.241 Fourth, the VSCC recommended that data be
maintained on the numbers of civil forfeitures and criminal
236. See 2015 Studies, VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, http://vscc.virginia.
gov/studies.asp (last visited Apr. 27, 2017) (stating that a comprehensive study
of Virginia’s civil asset forfeiture statutes will be conducted) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Caleb Kershner, Virginia State
Crime Commission Rejects Asset Forfeiture Reform, SIMMS SHOWERS LLP (Jan. 4,
2016), http://www.simmsshowerslaw.com/virginia-state-crime-commission-rejectsasset-forfeiture-reform/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (reporting that the VSCC
voted against endorsing HB 1287) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
237. See VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, supra note 4, at 101 (listing seven
recommendations and five items for consideration).
238. See id. (noting many times throughout the report about how there is a
current lack of transparency in these proceedings, and that such transparency is
needed). This Note considers only those recommendations that are relevant to
the issues that this Note addresses, although the VSCC did identify other
recommendations.
239. See id. at 102 (noting that the waiver system has been frequently
abused by other states and that it smacks of undue influence).
240. See id. (suggesting again that this type of transparency would aid in
public regard for Virginia law enforcement).
241. See id. (pointing out that there are approximately twenty other crimes
in which assets can be seized and for which no records are kept).
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convictions, stating that “the ability to match criminal
convictions with civil forfeiture proceedings is not readily
available.”242
2. Items for Consideration
The VSCC also listed a number of additional items for
consideration, noting that they would provide additional
protections for citizens.243 The VSCC did not endorse these
considerations, however, claiming a lack of “direct evidence of a
systemic pattern of abuse.”244 The items applicable to civil asset
forfeiture consisted of the following: staying civil forfeiture until
any criminal proceedings were resolved,245 increasing the burden
of proof to “clear and convincing,”246 requiring a criminal
conviction before forfeiture,247 and finally, requiring a criminal
conviction and exhaustion of all appeals before forfeiture, as was
seen in HB 1287.248
C. Legislative Success in 2016
Both HB 1287 and the VSCC report provided very different
solutions to Virginia’s civil asset forfeiture problems.249 HB 1287
proposed ending all civil forfeitures unless the property could be
directly tied to a criminal conviction.250 While this would solve
many of the problems in Virginia, it would also likely end most of
law enforcement’s seizures.251 Perhaps realizing this, the VSCC
242. Id. at 106.
243. Id. at 109.
244. Id.
245. See id. at 110–11 (tying this consideration into the initial House bill).
246. See id. at 113 (stating this after noting throughout the report that other
states use this burden of proof).
247. See id. at 114–15 (noting that the greater majority of law enforcement
agencies oppose this plan).
248. See id. at 116 (listing this measure as a possible consideration, while
still refusing to endorse HB 1287 as a valid option).
249. See supra Part V.A and V.B (explaining the two proposals and the
provisions contained therein).
250. See supra Part V.A (detailing the components of HB 1287).
251. See VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, supra note 4, at 81 (reporting how most

1336

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1295 (2017)

refused to endorse HB 1287, and instead proffered more limited
changes, such as ending the waiver system and requiring
agencies to report more data.252
Both HB 1287 and the VSCC recommendations had
advantages and disadvantages, and in early 2016 Senator Bill
Carrico introduced SB 457, a reform bill that fell in the middle of
the two of them.253 SB 457 left most of Virginia’s civil asset
forfeiture system in place (including the waiver system, ignoring
the VSCC recommendations), but raised the Commonwealth’s
burden of proof to clear and convincing evidence.254 A proposed
amendment to require a criminal conviction before forfeiture
failed to pass the Senate.255 However, the original version of SB
457 successfully passed both the Virginia Senate and House of
Delegates and was signed into law on April 1, 2016.256
Senate Bill 457 was an important reform bill that will help
restore property rights to Virginians.257 However, other elements
of Virginia’s system still need to be changed so that the property
asset forfeitures in Virginia occur without a criminal conviction).
252. See id. at 102–08 (relating the official recommendations of the VSCC).
253. See SB 457 Asset Forfeiture; Changes Burden of Proof, LEGIS. INFO.
SYS., https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?161+sum+SB457 (last visited
Apr. 27, 2017) [hereinafter LEGIS. INFO SYS., SB 457 Asset Forfeiture]
(introducing the bill on January 12, 2016) (on file with Washington and Lee Law
Review).
254. See id. (“Chang[ing] the Commonwealth’s burden of proof to clear and
convincing evidence from preponderance of the evidence in proving that the
property is subject to forfeiture in civil asset forfeiture cases.”).
255. See Christina Delgado, Legislation in Virginia Protects Property Owners
from
Government
Overreach,
FREEDOMWORKS
(Feb.
17,
2016),
http://www.freedomworks.org/content/legislation-virginia-protects-propertyowners-government-overreach (last visited Apr. 27, 2017) (explaining that the
proposed amendment failed after it met unanimous Republican opposition in the
Senate) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
256. LEGIS. INFO. SYS., SB 457 Asset Forfeiture, supra note 253; see also Tony
Bergida, Virginia General Assembly Unanimously Passes Civil Asset Forfeiture
Reform,
AM.
LEGIS.
EXCHANGE
COUNCIL
(Mar.
11,
2016),
https://www.alec.org/article/virginia-general-assembly-unanimously-passescivil-asset-forfeiture-reform/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2017) (noting how the passage
of SB 457 signals a shift in attitudes toward Virginian civil asset forfeiture
laws) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
257. See Delgado, supra note 255 (“Requiring the state to prove a stronger
argument in court before acquiring an owner’s assets helps Virginia move in the
right direction.”); Bergida, supra note 256 (“SB 457 is nevertheless sure to
improve [Virginia’s] ‘D-’ grade.”).
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rights of Virginians can be properly protected.258 The remainder
of this Note addresses the further changes that are necessary in
personal property and real property forfeitures to create a just
and equitable system.
1. Reforms of Virginia’s Personal Property Forfeitures
First, the waiver system needs to be abolished, and Virginia
should explore options for providing counsel to indigent property
owners who seek to contest the forfeiture of their property.
Virginia’s waiver system, which allows law enforcement officers
to cut deals with property owners, presents a distasteful situation
at best and a highly coercive situation at worst.259 Serious due
process concerns also exist due to the waiver system because it
allows law enforcement to bypass completely all existing
protections for innocent owners under the civil asset forfeiture
laws.260 When a law enforcement officer convinces a property
owner to sign over property to avoid criminal charges, all
protections are terminated—there is no innocent owner defense
in court, no appeals process, and no requirement that the state
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the property was
used in connection with the crime.261 Rather, the incident ends
there, and the officer returns with the assets (often just currency)
that will later be returned to his department262 and possibly to
him as a bonus.263 As the Virginia State Crime Commission
reported, no justification exists for retaining the waiver system in
258. See Delgado, supra note 255 (observing that “full restoration of citizens’
property rights against law enforcement is an ongoing struggle”).
259. See VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, supra note 4, at 102 (noting that the
process has been abused and can present the appearance of undue influence).
260. See Eric Moores, Reforming the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 51
ARIZ. L. REV. 777, 797 (2009) (explaining that the waiver system “permit[s] law
enforcement agencies to benefit from the inherent fear of an encounter with the
police, opening the door to deceit”).
261. See id. (pointing out that if a person signs a waiver, all forfeiture
proceedings end immediately).
262. See VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, supra note 4, at 65 (stating that DCJS
keeps 10% of the revenue from the forfeited assets and returns the rest to the
contributing law enforcement agencies).
263. See Gillard, supra note 189 (reporting that law enforcement employees
were paid bonuses out of asset forfeiture funds).
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place, and quite a lot of good could be accomplished if it were
ended.264 Unfortunately, SB 457 ignored the advice of the VSCC
and left the problem of waivers to be addressed another day.265
The problems of the waiver system—forcing an often
inexperienced owner to negotiate for his legal rights with the
state—are reflected in the lack of statutes allowing appointment
of counsel for indigent owners.266 The individuals that sign over
their property to law enforcement are often the same ones that
cannot afford representation: lower class minorities.267 If these
owners wish to contest the forfeiture of their property, they likely
cannot afford to do so out of pocket and are therefore faced with
the options of either giving up their ownership rights or trying to
represent themselves in court.268 Virginia repays attorney’s fees
for citizens who successfully contest forfeitures in court, but this
requires the owner to find pro bono representation or to pay for
his attorney up front.269 If Virginia does not wish to end the
waiver system entirely, due process concerns could be addressed
by appointing representation to indigent owners and requiring
that waiver negotiations be conducted between appointed counsel
and the Commonwealth’s Attorney.270
Second, more oversight and data-reporting should be
implemented statewide to prevent local abuses of forfeiture.
Virginia laws do require record-keeping of civil forfeiture funds in
regards to drug seizures, but the state requires much less
264. See VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, supra note 4, at 102 (“The use of ‘waivers’
by law enforcement . . . should be prohibited.”).
265. See LEGIS. INFO. SYS., SB 457 Asset Forfeiture, supra note 253
(increasing the burden of proof standard but neglecting to reform the waiver
system in Virginia).
266. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386 (2015) (detailing Virginia’s civil asset
forfeiture system and never providing for appointment of representation for
indigent property owners seeking to contest forfeiture).
267. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (reporting how a
Washington Post survey discovered that minorities comprise a large percentage
of civil forfeiture actions).
268. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (explaining how minorities
generally lack legal counsel more frequently than non-minorities do).
269. See § 19.2-386.12 (requiring that the Commonwealth recompense these
owners from the Criminal Fund).
270. See supra Part IV.A.2.b (discussing the ongoing issues with the waiver
system and lack of representation, and proposing a solution that could resolve
this conundrum).
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detailed reports of non-drug related forfeitures or forfeitures of
less than $500.271 On the local level, particularly, civil seizures
are often worth less than $500.272 In addition, bribes and other
mismanagement of funds have occurred in the realm of small
sums, which can be easily concealed under the existing reporting
bar of $500.273 These forfeited assets are or were the property of
American citizens, guilty or not, and when law enforcement is
permitted the use of them, Virginia should require that an
adequate accounting be made of their expenditure, just like any
other business.274
2. Reforms of Virginia’s Real Property Forfeitures
Fortunately for Virginians, existing law in the
Commonwealth provides that egregious forfeitures of real
property for minor drug offenses will not occur.275 That being
said, further protections for real property are warranted due to
the unique, irreplaceable nature of real property.276 Given the
limited number of real property forfeitures and the grave impact
that an errant forfeiture can have on Virginia citizens, reforms in
this area would have a minimal effect on law enforcement
priorities and would have an extremely beneficial effect for real
property owners.277 While Oregon boasts the strictest protections
271. See VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, supra note 4, at 72 (noting that data is
not collected for items seized in connection with non-drug related criminal acts).
272. See id. at 76 (reporting that seizures in the past five years have been as
low as $71).
273. See Kerr, supra note 191 (observing that several of the bribe amounts
were only a few hundred dollars); see also Lee, supra note 186 (detailing
forfeiture funds as being incorrectly spent on smaller items such as bottles of
liquor and keg taps).
274. See supra Part II (examining the history of civil asset forfeiture and
explaining how such assets are seized from the personal belongings of American
citizens).
275. See supra notes 223–24 and accompanying text (mandating that real
property connected with drugs can only be seized when the underlying drug
offense is serious enough to warrant a sentence of at least five years).
276. See supra Part IV.B.1 (explaining Radin’s analysis of how a person’s
identity becomes intertwined with possession of real property such as a house or
farm).
277. See supra Part IV.B.3 (describing the relatively small position that real
property occupies in the grand scheme of Virginia’s civil asset forfeiture).
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for real property, mandating a criminal conviction before
forfeiture followed by clear and convincing evidence that the
property was related to the crime,278 even smaller changes—such
as the Californian approach of solely requiring a criminal
conviction279—would aid in protecting citizens from losing an
irreplaceable possession.
VI. Conclusion
Problems with civil asset forfeiture extend across the United
States, and Virginia is no exception.280 Fortunately, many states
have enacted reform measures to better protect their citizens
from mistaken property seizures.281 Virginia’s congressmen have
produced reform bills of their own, but although these efforts
produced positive results, further reform is still necessary.282
Unfortunately, until recently, very little information about
Virginia’s forfeitures had been compiled for either the public or
for oversight groups.283 As reporters, statisticians, and agencies
continue to collect such data, further revelations may arise that
would call for even more reforms.284 For example, the ultimate
reform of returning Virginia back to 1991—when all forfeited
assets were given to the Virginia Literary Fund, rather than to
law enforcement—may be required if further research unearths
278. OR. REV. STAT. § 131A.255(1) (2009).
279. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11488.4(i).
280. See supra Part IV (describing the problems seen in Virginia, many of
which are also seen on the national level).
281. See, e.g., supra note 174 (reporting on the recent reform measures seen
in other states).
282. See supra Part V.A (explaining the progression of reform bills through
the Virginia House of Delegates).
283. See VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, supra note 4, at 66–67 (noting that the
VSCC, in order to complete its report, conducted a thorough investigation,
requesting data from six different Virginia agencies, departments, and court
systems, as well as all law enforcement agencies and Commonwealth’s
Attorney’s Offices); see also id. at 103–06 (stating that information on civil asset
forfeitures should be compiled in a manner accessible to the public to increase
Virginians’ confidence in their criminal justice system).
284. See id. at 105 (revealing that, currently, the Department of Criminal
Justice Services does not require information on non-drug asset forfeiture, a
category that encompasses approximately twenty other offenses).
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more
evidence
Virginia
law
enforcement’s
funds
285
mismanagement. For the time being, however, a commonsense
approach is needed that addresses the waiver system, the
appointment of counsel, and the direct oversight of law
enforcement.286 Fortunately for Virginians, however, it appears
that the Commonwealth is heading in the right direction.287

285. See id. at 10 (explaining how the current system of returning asset
proceeds to law enforcement did not exist in Virginia until 1991).
286. See supra Part V.C (proposing a compromise plan to resolve current
issues with Virginia’s forfeiture system).
287. See Bergida, supra note 258 (“Although the Virginia Senate rejected a
proposed amendment requiring a criminal conviction for the state to secure a
judgement [sic] of forfeiture, SB 457 is nevertheless sure to improve that ‘D-’
grade. The bipartisan sponsorship and support of the bill is a good sign moving
forward.”).

